The Aging Population and the Size of the Welfare State: Is There a Puzzle? by Cameron A. Shelton
























Department of Economics 
Public Affairs Center 
238 Church Street 
Middletown, CT 06459-007 
 
Tel: (860) 685-2340 
Fax: (860) 685-2301 
http://www.wesleyan.edu/econ 
The Aging Population and the Size of the Welfare State: 
Is There a Puzzle? 
 
Cameron A. Shelton 
 
January 10, 2007 





This paper tests several leading hypotheses on determinants of government expenditure. The
purpose is to avoid omitted variables bias by testing the prominent theories in a comprehensive
speci¯cation, to identify persistent puzzles for the current set of theories, and to explore those
puzzles in greater depth by looking at the composition of government expenditure and the level
of government at which it takes place as well as its magnitude. Using Global Financial Statis-
tics data from the IMF covering over 100 countries from 1970-2000, I look at cross-sectional
and inter-temporal variation in government expenditure and both individual categories of ex-
penditure (such as defense, education, health care) and di®erent levels of government (central,
state, and local). Among other results, I ¯nd a new explanation for Wagner's Law, widespread
evidence that preference heterogeneity leads to decentralization rather than outright decreases
in expenditures, that a great deal of the expenditure associated with increased trade openness
is not in categories that explicitly insure for risk, and evidence that both political access and
income inequality a®ect the extent of social insurance.
1 Introduction
Because of a paucity of data and correlation among the explanatory variables, theories of govern-
ment size are often di±cult to test. This paper makes headway in two directions. First, gathering
the leading hypotheses and testing them together in a uni¯ed speci¯cation avoids omitted variables
bias and the temptation to data-mine by playing with the speci¯cation. Second, using spending
data disaggregated both by category of expenditure (education, healthcare, social security, etc.)
and by level of government (central and local) enables more nuanced tests of many of these theories.
Two explanatory variables which tend to correlate with similar behavior of total expenditure may
correlate with very di®erent patterns in the disaggregated data.
This approach yields a variety of interesting new results.
1. Much of the increase in total expenditure associated with greater trade openness is at-
tributable to categories that do not insure for risk. This is especially true in less-developed
countries.
2. In less-developed countries, greater trade openness is associated with a centralization of ex-
penditure: the increase in central government expenditures is partially o®set by a decrease
in local government expenditures.
¤I am endebted to Romain Wacziarg for multiple readings and to two anonymous referees for thorough and
insightful comments.
13. In more populous countries and countries with greater ethnic fractionalization, spending on
many categories of public goods (education, healthcare, public order and safety) is decentral-
ized: lower spending by the central government is signi¯cantly o®set by higher spending by
local governments.
4. A greater fraction of the population over 65 is associated with large and signi¯cant increases
in local government expenditure in almost every category.
5. Wagner's Law is shown to be driven by demographics: richer countries are older and spend
more on social security which boosts total expenditure. Total spending net of social security
actually declines with per capita income.
6. In industrialized democracies, better political rights and greater inequality are each associated
with more redistribution, though the interaction term is negative.
7. Majoritarian governments do not display a clear bias towards or against any type of spending:
they simply correlate with reduced expenditure across the board.
Theories of government size tend to focus either on determinants of demand for government
services or, more recently, on the structure of the supply of these services. Most theories identify
a variable thought to shift demand for government spending and hypothesize that ceteris paribus,
a shift in this variable leads to a corresponding change in equilibrium expenditure on a certain
class of public goods or transfers. For example, a larger population of elderly in a country implies
a greater demand for social security (as well as a larger fraction of the population receiving it)
and thus higher public expenditure on social security in equilibrium. Demand-driven theories
have nominated a variety of demographic factors as explanatory variables: demographics, ethnic
fragmentation, and trade openness are popular examples.
While demand-side theories usually treat the formation of policy as a black-box, supply-side
theories construct political economy models of representative government to give structure to the
supply of public goods. They seek to explain variation in the pattern of expenditure as a func-
tion of political organization: electoral rules, the type of government, and the degree of political
participation.
Many of the explanatory variables nominated by these theories are correlated: trade shares tend
to be smaller in more populous countries, richer countries tend to have better political rights (or
vice-versa), and richer countries tend to have an older populace to name a few. Table 7 lists sample
correlations between explanatory variables. In the basic sample, 7 of the 15 sample correlations
have an absolute value in excess of 0.5. As a result, tests which focus solely on one or even just
a few of these variables almost surely su®er from omitted variables bias. The ¯rst purpose of this
paper is to gather the prominent theories and test them collectively to avoid such bias.
The second purpose is to use data breaking out public expenditure into categories (defense,
education, health care) and di®erent levels of government (central and local) to formulate more
nuanced tests of the leading theories. Theories which lead to similar predictions at the aggregate
level are distinguishable at a ¯ner level. An omitted variable may produce a coarse pattern at
the aggregate level but it is less likely to reproduce the more intricate pattern predicted in data
disaggregated by category and government level. While previous contributions have, in pursuit of
a particular point, looked at the behavior of subcategories of public expenditure, the contribution
of this paper is the consistent application of this technique to a broad set of explanatory variables.
Moreover, while work on ¯scal federalism commonly examines di®erent levels of government, most
empirical work on theories of government size examines only central government expenditures.
2The choice of which variables to include was a judgement call made after an examination of the
literature on government size. It was made prior to the regression analysis and kept ¯xed. The goal
was to include those demographic and political variables which have generated widespread interest
among economists, have repeatedly been shown to be correlated with patterns in government
expenditure, and for which a causal mechanism has been proposed which would inform ex-ante
predictions of regression coe±cients.
Nine theories articulating the e®ects of eight independent variables were selected: Rodrik's
theory of trade openness; the Alesina-Wacziarg theory of country size; Wagner's Law concerning
the relationship between income and government; Easterly and co-authors' theory on the role
of ethnic fractionalization; Meltzer and Richard's theory of the role of inequality and Benabou's
extension of this theory to include political rights; the theories of Persson and Tabellini and Milesi-
Feretti, Peroti and Rostagno on the role of electoral rules and government type; and the work of
Oates and many others highlighting the role of a federal system in shaping patterns of expenditure.
The ¯rst ¯ve variables|trade openness, population, per capita income, ethnic fractionalization,
and income inequality|may be characterized as demand shifters. The last four|the extent of
political representation, the type of electoral system (majoritarian or proportional), government
type (presidential or parliamentary), and a dummy for a federal system|capture aspects of the
supply of public goods: the manner in which the political system operates on a ¯xed demand.
The plethora of candidates for country-speci¯c ¯xed e®ects that might be correlated with re-
gressors are a constant temptation for those inclined to a kitchen sink approach. Geographic
characteristics such as whether a country is an island or landlocked or split by a large mountain-
range may be correlated with its trade openness as inter-national trade is made easier or harder
relative to intra-national trade. Features of national history such as the date of independence
may be correlated with the institutional structure as new constitutions are written with an eye
to concurrently popular political ideas. Cultural and religious identi¯cation may be correlated
with population growth through shared views on birth control. The prevalence of corruption may
a®ect the composition of government expenditure as certain types of expenditure may be more
easily siphoned o® for graft (see Mauro 1998) Since the list is inexhaustible, some degree of bias
is inevitable. I have made the choice to stick with those variables which have been repeatedly
demonstrated to have ¯rst-order e®ects on patterns of expenditure.
Section II reviews the previous results on the explanatory variables of interest. Sections III and
IV lay out the empirical strategy and discuss the data. Sections V and VI present the results of
this study and the implications of those results. Section VII concludes. The paper may be read in
order, following the entire set of explanatory variables simultaneously. Alternately, sections II, V,
and VI are each broken down by variable so a reader who is interested in following the results for
a single explanatory variable may do so by reading the relevant subsections.
2 Literature Review
Openness
David Cameron (1978) was the ¯rst to convincingly demonstrate a connection between trade open-
ness and government ¯nance. In a sample of 18 OECD countries1, Cameron found openness in
1960 to be a strong predictor of the increase in government tax revenues as a share of GDP be-
tween 1960 and 1975. He postulated that more open countries were more heavily unionized which,
1Cameron's sample includes: Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Canada, Britain, Ireland, Austria,
Finland, Switzerland, France, Australia, Germany, Spain, Italy, Japan, and the United States.
3through collective bargaining, lead to greater demand for government transfers in the form of social
protection and reeducation. Rodrik (1998) noted that the correlation extends to countries of all
income levels and exists for all available measures of government consumption. He asserts that
Cameron's collective bargaining explanation is unlikely to explain the correlation in the broader
sample of countries due to the relative weakness of organized labor in developing countries. Rodrik
hypothesizes that government expenditure may serve as a form of insurance against external risk.
In more open countries, the income streams of households are derived from ¯rms which do more
overseas business and are thus subject to greater external risk such as exchange rate risk or supply
or demand °uctuations abroad. Assuming some portion of this risk cannot be diversi¯ed away,
this would generate demand for public insurance against external risk. Rodrik surmises that ad-
vanced countries with the requisite administrative capacity mitigate this undiversi¯ed external risk
through spending on social protection while developing countries, lacking the capacity to admin-
ister large-scale social transfer programs, rely on simpler, less-targeted solutions including public
employment.
Country Size
Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) o®er an explanation for the observed fact that larger countries have
smaller government consumption as a share of GDP. Their argument is built on two ideas taken
from the literature on country formation.2 First, sharing non-rivalrous public goods over larger
populations results in lower per-capita costs of provision. Second, larger populations tend to exhibit
greater heterogeneity in preferences over public goods provision. Equilibrium country size emerges
as a tradeo® between the costs of increasingly heterogeneous preferences and the bene¯ts of sharing
non-rivalrous public goods over larger populations. The result is that larger countries tend to exhibit
lower per capita expenditure on public goods.
Meanwhile, smaller countries are more open to trade. To the extent that market size in°uences
productivity3, smaller countries are more negatively impacted by a closed world trading system.
Put di®erently, smaller countries are more viable under open trading systems because they can
bene¯t from spillovers due to foreign production. Thus not only are small countries are more likely
to be open to trade, but small countries will be more common during periods of greater trade
integration. Together, these e®ects imply that smaller countries are both more open to trade and
spend more on public goods.
Alesina and Wacziarg supply a pair of results that support their assumptions. First, in the
regression of per capita government consumption on log of population, the latter has a negative
and signi¯cant coe±cient, supporting the conjecture that larger countries spend less on public
goods. Second, when transfers and interest payments are added to government consumption and
the regression is rerun, the point estimate is relatively stable but the signi¯cance drops markedly
suggesting that per capita transfers are unrelated to country size. The e®ect exists in public goods
but not in transfers. Next, both Wacziarg (2001) and Alesina and Wacziarg demonstrate that
country size and openness are negatively related in the presence of a wide range of controls. And
these results are replicated in regressions in which more direct measures of trade policy such as
tari®s and measures of \outward orientation" are substituted for openness (see Sachs-Warner 1995).
Fragmentation
Other demographic factors may also lead to greater heterogeneity of preferences and thus lower
levels of public expenditure. Easterly and Levine (1997) report a strong negative correlation be-
2See Alesina-Spolaore (1997) and Alesina-Spolaore-Wacziarg (1997)
3See here the vast literature on monopolistic competition with a variety of goods and inputs and the resulting
increasing returns to scope and economy size.
4tween indices of ethnic fragmentation and measures of public goods (telecommunications networks,
transportation network, electricity grids, and education) in African countries. This may happen
either because di®erent ethnic groups have di®erent preferences over the set of public goods to be
provided and so fail to agree on expenditure or because an ethnic group's utility from public goods
declines when the public goods are shared with other ethnic groups. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly
(1999) document a body of work suggesting that preferences about public policy are correlated
with ethnicity. They then submit that, in the presence of heterogeneous preferences (in this case
driven by ethnicity), interest group activity may encourage, via log-rolling, an increase in targeted
expenditure at the expense of public goods provision.4
The evidence is based on US fragmentation and expenditures data from three levels of aggregation|
cities, metropolitan areas, and counties. Their primary result is the negative correlation between
ethnic fragmentation and several measures of public goods expenditure including per capita spend-
ing on public education. They also note that ethnic fragmentation is positively correlated with
police spending, possibly due to increased violent crime. Surprisingly, expenditure on health and
hospitals increases with ethnic fragmentation. Total spending per capita is positively related to
ethnic fragmentation in all three samples, consistent with the log-rolling theory.
Interestingly, the authors rerun the regressions including both the ethnic fragmentation variable
and a similar variable capturing only black vs. non-black heterogeneity. The broader fragmentation
coe±cient is still signi¯cantly di®erent from zero, implying that the impact of ethnic fragmentation
on public expenditure in American cities is not just a black vs. non-black issue.
In a follow-up, Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (2000) suggest that increased fragmentation may
lead to higher levels of public employment as public o±cials circumvent opposition to explicit tax
and transfer schemes by employing individuals who would otherwise receive transfers. They ¯nd
some support using US city-level data.
Among their results, Alesina et al (2003) report that ethnic fragmentation is negatively associ-
ated with the ratio of transfers to GDP, con¯rming similar results found by Alesina, Glaser, and
Sacerdote (2001) and Alesina and Wacziarg (1998). They propose that achieving consensus neces-
sary for redistribution to the needy is more di±cult in ethnically diverse societies. They achieve
similar but less signi¯cant results for their index of linguistic fragmentation. Interestingly, they
report a positive relationship between religious fragmentation and redistribution. To explain the
di®erence between the result for religious fragmentation and those for ethnic and linguistic frag-
mentation, the authors note that while ethnicity and language are largely ¯xed, religious a±liation
is °exible and therefore endogenous. Observed religious fragmentation is often the result of greater
tolerance by the government or majority. And this tolerance (or factors leading to it) may explain
both observed religious fragmentation and increased transfers.
Income
One of the earliest hypotheses in the literature on government size is the view that the public
sector tends to grow as a society becomes wealthier, commonly known as Wagner's Law. Wagner
gave two main reasons in his original work. First, he postulated that as states grow more wealthy
they simultaneously grow more complex, increasing the need for public regulatory and protective
action to ensure the smooth workings of a modern, specialized economy. Second, he postulated that
certain public goods, such as education and cultural enhancements, are luxury goods. The essence
of Wagner's Law is the assertion that the ratio of civilian government expenditure (excluding defense
4The authors note that when measured by expenditure share rather than in levels, the e®ects will appear even
stronger.
5spending) to GDP is positively related to GDP per capita.5 Baumol's Law would imply a similar
relationship if productivity growth in the government sector were slower than the economy-wide
average.
Henrekson (1993) notices that the bulk of the support for Wagner's Law derives from regressions
in levels and, invoking Granger and Newbold (1974), cautions that regression equations speci¯ed
in levels of time series often lead to erroneous inferences if the variables are non-stationary. He
contends that income and the share of government expenditure, while correlated, are not, in fact,
cointegrated, and demonstrates this in Swedish time series data from 1861-1990. He concludes that
the correlation reported by other researchers may be spurious.6 However, Oxley (1994) examines
data on Britain from 1870-1913, and ¯nds evidence that Wagner's Law holds and does satisfy
Granger causality.7 Per capita income and government size are also correlated in the modern
period. In a broad sample of 115 countries from 1950-80, Ram (1987) ¯nds evidence for Wagner's
Law in some of the time-series though not in the cross-section. However, other authors have found
evidence in the cross-section. Comparing Latin America with the OECD, Stein, Talvi, and Grisanti
(1998) observe, \the size of government in the lowest income quartile of Latin America averages
20% of GDP compared to 30% of GDP in the highest and 48% of GDP in OECD countries. In
other words, richer countries tend to have larger governments." And Easterly and Rebelo (1993)
¯nd strong evidence for Wagner's Law in both cross-sectional data covering 105 countries from
1970-1988 and historical data covering 26 countries from 1870-1988. The correlation between per
capita income and government size is frequently found in both longitudinal and cross-sectional data
in both historical and current periods.
Income Inequality
Not only the average level of income, but also the distribution of income in society may a®ect public
spending. In their seminal paper, Meltzer and Richard (1981) construct a general equilibrium
model connecting the size of public sector redistribution (not public sector consumption) to the
extent of the franchise and the distribution of wealth. Individuals in their model are endowed with
heterogeneous labor productivity. They perform two activities: they vote on a linear income tax rate
whose proceeds are used to ¯nance lump-sum redistribution and they make a labor-leisure choice.
Tax preferences are single-peaked about an ideal point which is weakly monotonically decreasing in
productivity (and thus in income). Under direct democracy with universal su®rage and majority
rule, the voter with the median income is decisive. To the decisive voter, the cost of taxation
is proportional to his own income while the bene¯ts are proportional to the mean income. Thus
Meltzer and Richard conclude that redistribution in majority rule societies is positively related to
a particular measure of skew in the income distribution: the ratio of mean to median income.8
Using annual data for the United States for the period 1936-1972, Meltzer and Richard (1983)
estimate the elasticity of the income tax rate with respect to the ratio of median to mean income.
They report coe±cients that are signi¯cantly di®erent from zero, indicating that the general e®ect
they describe is present, but which fall short of the value predicted by theory, indicating that the
particular structural form they test is not a perfect description of the mechanism at work.
Political Rights
5See Henrekson for a discussion of interpreting Wagner's theories and how to bring them to data.
6See Oxley for a list of papers testing Wagner's Law
7Oxley admits that the country and period were chosen to give cointegration of income and government expenditure
the best possible chance.
8Krussel and Rios-Rull (1999) extend the MR model to a dynamic setting which allows them to account for the
distorting e®ects of a tax on capital. The result is an extension of the basic MR result to the distribution of wealth as
well as income. They conclude that the basic MR framework over-predicts taxation by omitting this second distortion.
6Meltzer and Richard (MR) implicitly assumed the median income and the decisive vote belonged
to one and the same citizen. But in many countries political rights are, either de jure or de
facto, restricted to a privileged minority. And even in the most established democracies, the
overwhelming evidence is that the wealthy are more active in a wide variety of forms of political
participation: voting, campaign contributions, contacting and working for lawmakers, boycotts,
and demonstrations.9 Lijphart (1997) notes that while voter turnout is less skewed toward the
rich than other measures of participation, the pattern is persistent across advanced countries since
the time of universal su®rage, and has widened over the past few decades as turnout in advanced
democracies has declined. Benabou (1996) notes that if wealthier citizens are better represented
in the political process, then the gap between mean and median income exaggerates the extent to
which redistribution via the proposed mechanism will take place. In a cross-country sample, then,
testing for the MR e®ect requires inclusion of an index of political rights as well as a measure of
the skewness of the income distribution.
Furthermore, poll taxes, literacy requirements, and su®rage limitations can drive a wedge be-
tween the statutory and e®ective franchise. Assuming the newly enfranchised earn a lower income
than those who already enjoy political rights, an expansion of the franchise will result in a decline in
the income of the median voter and thus an increase in the tax rate and level of transfers preferred
by the median voter.
Using US state level data on expenditure and turnout from 1870-1940, Lott and Kenny (1999)
¯nd that the increase in voter turnout due to women's su®rage explains on the order of 20% of
a 90% increase in expenditure over the period: a large but not overwhelming part of the drastic
increase in state expenditures. Husted and Kenny (1997) look at the e®ects of the removal of
poll taxes and literacy tests (e®ectively extensions of the franchise to poorer voters) on government
expenditure using biennial US state and local data for 1950-1988. They document a strong increase
in the size of welfare spending (transfers) as the decisive voter becomes poorer but little e®ect in
public goods.
However, recent work by Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin (2002, 2004) calls into question the
impact of political rights on transfers. In a pair of studies questioning the di®erence between
democracies and autocracies, the authors ¯nd that, controlling for income level, income inequality,
and demographics, government type has no e®ect on social security expenditures. Mulligan, Gil,
and Sala-i-Martin (2002) have particularly strong results based on data and methods which are
quite similar to mine. Their table (1) column (10) includes the Gini coe±cient, a democracy
index, and an interaction term as well as controls for retirees, per capita income. They use the
Polity IV measure of democracy but note that in their sample it correlates highly with the Gastil
index for political rights. They ¯nd little e®ect of either inequality or democracy on social security
expenditures in the cross-section for the period 1960-1990. In their more detailed work on the
institutional design, they ¯nd little di®erence between democracies and non-democracies. This
mirrors the results of an earlier study by Easterly and Rebelo (1993) who also ¯nd, \no signi¯cant
di®erences in the ¯scal policies adopted by democracies and non-demoracies once we control for
the level of income."
Institutions of Government
The Meltzer-Richard model is an early attempt to understand how the structure of government
a®ects the equilibrium level of expenditures. It is a model in which direct democracy implies a
role for income inequality. More recent political economy models focus on how di®erent types of
9See Lijphart (1997) for references documenting inequality in political participation in the US and other industri-
alized countries over the last century.
7representative democracy a®ect the composition of government expenditure. Milesi-Feretti, Peroti,
and Rostagno (2002), Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1998), Austen-Smith (2000) each discuss the
role of majoritarian vs. proportional electoral systems. And Person and Tabellini (1999) compare
presidential and parliamentary systems of government. One important di®erence between various
theories is their assumption about the target-ability of di®erent categories of public expenditure.
Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1998) and Milesi-Feretti, Peroti, and Rostagno (2002) generate
contradictory hypotheses concerning the e®ects of electoral rules on public expenditure. Persson,
Roland, and Tabellini construct a Downsian model of electoral competition with forward-looking
voters. Contrasting majoritarian and proportional voting rules, they ¯nd that the former focuses
electoral competition on a few key districts, leading to fewer public goods but more redistribution
than the latter. In a related model Austen-Smith (2000) generate similar predictions. The as-
sumption which drives the result is that public goods are broadly enjoyed while transfers are more
explicitly targetable to a particular district.
Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno derive their hypothesis from the di®erences between so-
cially de¯ned constituencies and geographically de¯ned constituencies. Majoritarian systems elect
one representative from each geographically-de¯ned district. If the distribution of social groups is
reasonably stable across districts, this results in a socially homogenous legislature in which legis-
lators di®er and thus are judged based on support delivered to their geographic constituency. For
example, Barbara Boxer and Diane Feinstein are held accountable more for their representation of
California than for their representation of women. As a result, representatives in a majoritarian
system will be more concerned with obtaining ¯scal support for their geographic constituency than
for their social group. In contrast, proportional systems elect representatives who are beholden
to a national constituency de¯ned along social lines and so focus on payments to this socially de-
¯ned constituency. Finally, they assume that redistributive transfers (unemployment, reeducation,
welfare) are more easily targeted to social groups while public goods (military bases, highways,
dams) are more easily targeted to geographic groups. They conclude that representatives under
a majoritarian electoral system will pay more attention to spending which can be targeted to
their constituents|public goods|while proportionally elected representatives will favor transfers
to their social constituency. Hence the hypothesized association between electoral rules and the
pattern of public expenditure depends on the presumed targetability of various types of government
spending.
Persson and Tabellini (1999) test their hypotheses on both electoral systems and legislative
structure using cross-country data from a sample of 64 countries classi¯ed as democracies in the
period 1985-1990.10 They ¯nd that majoritarian electoral systems are associated with less expen-
diture in public goods but the results are weak and they don't look at the e®ect on transfers.
Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno construct three measures of the degree of proportionality of
electoral systems for 40 OECD and Latin American countries. They split government expenditure
into three categories: primary expenditure, transfers, and public goods. They proceed to regress
each category of government expenditure on each of the three measures of the electoral system.
They ¯nd strong support in OECD countries for the proposition that governments elected under
a majoritarian rule spend less on transfers than those elected under a proportional rule. Support
in Latin American countries is weaker: coe±cients are of the right sign but small in magnitude.
Support for their hypothesis that majoritarian governments spend more on public goods is similarly
weak.
10Their threshold for democracy is a raw score of 5 or less in the Gastil index of political rights (lower means better
rights).
8These results seem directly contradictory but in fact they are each consistent with the fact that
majoritarian governments simply spend less across the board. Both studies o®er incomplete support
for their theories. On the one hand, Persson and Tabellini work with a full range of controls, but
document an e®ect on public goods only, ignoring transfers. On the other hand, Milesi-Ferretti,
Perotti, and Rostagno do look at both transfers and public goods but include only minimal controls.
Furthermore, they ¯nd a strong e®ect only in transfers.
Persson and Tabellini (1999) analyze legislative structure (presidential vs. parliamentary) in
a model of legislative bargaining with retrospective voting. They conclude that the separation of
powers which de¯nes a presidential regime results in more competition between policy-makers and
thus in smaller, more e±cient government with less waste, less redistribution and lower expenditure
on public goods. Because it places weight on legislative cohesion, the parliamentary regime facil-
itates log-rolling and therefore produces larger, more wasteful government but with higher levels
of public goods expenditures and more broadly targeted transfers. They conclude that there is a
tradeo® between accountability and public-goods provision in legislative design. And the resolution
of this tradeo® has implications for patterns of government expenditure.11 In empirical work, they
¯nd that a presidential system is associated with a great deal less spending, especially on public
goods, in the presence of either electoral system.
3 Methodology
The core exercise of this paper is to regress various measures of government expenditure on a
vector of explanatory variables in a cross-country panel. There are complications in the data:
measurement error in both the left and right hand side variables and country-speci¯c e®ects that
are correlated with regressors.12 The technique is random e®ects on data averaged over multi-year
periods.
The ¯rst source of measurement error is simply in collection and transmission. The data used in
this paper are macro-indicators collected for roughly one hundred countries are sometimes several
steps removed from ¯rst hand data collection. They often involve estimation rather than measure-
ment. A second source of measurement error is the distance between the measure used and the
theoretical concept it is meant to capture. This problem is re°ective of both the paucity of available
data and the lack of direct measures for many of the theoretical concepts.
Another important issue concerning measurement error is the di®erential quality of data. Not
only is data more widely available for rich countries, it is also undoubtedly of better quality. This
means there is heteroskedasticity in the error term, which I adjust for by using a robust standard
error. The di®erential availability I deal with by running two speci¯cations: a restricted one
including the variables with the widest coverage and a complete speci¯cation with fewer countries.
11See Persson-Tabellini 2004, Persson-Roland-Tabellini 2000, Persson-Tabellini 1999. For a description of the
majoritarian and presidential variables, see Persson-Tabellini 2004. Because of the rarity of major constitutional
design, these variables display almost no time-variation in the sample.
12Hauk and Wacziarg (2003) use Monte Carlo methods to assess the tradeo® between unobserved heterogeneity
and measurement error in the human-capital augmented version of the Solow neo-classical growth model. No such
study exists for the literature on government size, at least in part because no prominent model exists to inform the
speci¯cation, but some of these lessons are likely to be valid. Speci¯cally, choosing between ¯xed e®ects and estimators
that use some degree of between country variation is a tradeo® between omitted variables bias and measurement bias.
Fixed e®ects solves omitted variables bias but tends to exacerbate bias from measurement error when the right-hand
side variables are more persistent than the errors in measurement. Mindful of this tradeo® and without a study for
this speci¯c example, I have chosen to use random e®ect but average the data over ¯ve-year periods.
9The expenditures data is probably more accurate for richer countries, which further contributes
to heteroskedasticity. This constitutes another reason for robust standard errors. Otherwise, LHS
measurement error simply increases the standard errors which stacks the deck against signi¯cant
e®ects.
Government spending in any given year (or ¯ve year span) is in°uenced by demographic and
constitutional factors that produce long-run supply and demand. But on top of this there are
short-run shocks to the supply and demand for public goods due to events and due to the fact that
the \market" for public goods doesn't clear immediately but does so in ¯ts and starts as spending
is approved. The current theories of government size speak to factors which in°uence the long-run,
persistent supply and demand so other °uctuations are properly characterized as error. Whether
you think of this as econometric error or LHS measurement error depends on what you think you're
trying to measure and explain. We are trying to measure and explain the persistent equilibrium
expenditure due to the underlying persistent supply and demand factors advanced by theories of
government size. So in this case, most of these short-run shocks due to discreteness of expenditure
and political shocks ought to be thought of as measurement error rather than econometric error.
As a result we average annual data across a period of y > 1 years. On the other hand, factors
a®ecting long-run supply and demand aren't stationary over a thirty year period so we can't simply
take the between estimator. There exists a tradeo®: a longer period reduces the measurement error
to the extent that such error is not autocorrelated, but makes it less likely that the RHS variables
(and hence the equilibrium) are stationary over the period. The choice y = 5 (leaving 4-6 periods
per country) is a common compromise and is the baseline for this study.
Because some of the explanatory variables are persistent to the point of being almost constant
(e.g. political institutions), I have checked the results using the between e®ects estimator (essen-
tially y=30) to see whether coe±cients for these variables are signi¯cant only because the same
observation is taken multiple times over the 30 year period. Most of the results are robust: I
mention those that are not.
The basic speci¯cation is
Expenditureit = ® + ¯ ¤ Explanatory Variablesit + ui + ²it
Of which a speci¯c example would be
Transfers (central government)it = ® + ¯1 ¤ ln(population)it
+¯2 ¤ ln(GDP per capita)it
+¯3 ¤ opennessit
+¯4 ¤ opennessit ¤ OECD membership in 1975it
+¯5 ¤ index of ethnic fractionalizationit
+¯6 ¤ fraction of population over 65it
+ui + ²it
Where i indexes the country and t indexes the 5 year period.
The extended speci¯cation simply adds explanatory variables.
104 Data
The primary source of data for this study is the IMF Government Financial Statistics (GFS) dataset.
The GFS is a standardized collection of annual national accounts for over one hundred countries.
I use the GFS data on government expenditures, which includes all non-repayable payments by
any level of government for either current or capital purposes. GFS classi¯es expenditure by two
methods: either by economic characteristics or by the function or purpose served. Both are used in
this study. The former is called the economic classi¯cation of government expenditure (ECOG) and
breaks total spending into current and capital expenditure and then further into goods and services
vs. transfers. The latter is called the classi¯cation of the functions of government (COFOG) and
breaks total expenditure into categories such as healthcare, education, and defense, each of which
include both current and capital expenditure.13. In addition to being cut according to one of two
methods of classi¯cation, total expenses are also classi¯ed according to the level of government:
central or local. So a sample GFS series would be expenditure by the central government on
education as a share of GDP and observations would be by country-year. The raw data is gross
expenditure in local currency so I divide by the contemporaneous GDP in local currency to achieve
expenditure as a share of GDP, which is a unit-less measure.
The fractionalization data is care of Alesina et. al. (2003) and is described in their appendix.
Data on political systems is care of Persson and Tabellini (1999) and is described in their appendix.
Openness data come from the Penn World Tables and are measured in current prices. My political
rights variable is derived from the Gastil index of the same name. The list of questions from
which the political rights index is composed and the ranking methodology are available at the
Freedom House website. The raw index runs from 1 to 7, with lower numbers indicating greater
political freedom. I have taken the inverse of the index to obtain a variable which runs from 1/7
to 1 and in which larger numbers indicate greater political freedom. Some demographics data (per
capita GDP and population) come from the Penn World Tables. Other demographics data (Over65,
Under15) are taken from the World Bank World Development Indicators Database. Gini coe±cients
come from the United Nations Development Program World Income Inequality Database (WIID)
which includes and builds upon the well-known Deininger-Squire data. Documentation is available
from the UNDP website. The UN groups these data into reliable and unreliable data and further
categorizes them by the source of the accounts and the population over which they are valid. I
have used only data marked reliable and stemming from income or expenditures data covering the
entire population.
I follow Persson and Tabellini (1999) in de¯ning expenditures on public goods as the sum of
transportation, education, and public order and safety, citing these as the expenditures categories
with high public goods content.14 Government consumption, wages and salaries, and transfers are
all categories from ECOG.
To form ¯ve year panels from annual data, I took the arithmetic averages of the available
annual values for each variable.15 Summary statistics for the variables can be found in tables
8, 9, and 10. With a slew of variables and a bevy of countries, there are, inevitably, gaps in the
data. Many variables are available for a wide swath of countries: GDP, population, and many of the
broader expenditure categories. But some variables, most notably the inequality data (Gini) and the
13The detailed analysis of how each category is de¯ned and how expenditures are classi¯ed is available in A Manual
on Government Financial Statistics 1986
14They justify their omission of defense spending by noting that it depends on geopolitical variables that are beyond
the scope of the theory and di±cult to control for.
15Because my data stretches 31 years from 1970-2000, the ¯rst panel is six years from 1970-1975.
11political institutions data (majoritaran, presidential), su®er from more limited coverage. In order
to evaluate the role of each theory in the broadest possible sample, I have run two speci¯cations: a
basic speci¯cation including those variables available for all countries in the GFS and an extended
speci¯cation including all of the independent variables.
Including the limited variables in the regressions cuts the number of countries from 90-100 in
the basic speci¯cation to 40-45 in the more inclusive speci¯cations and the total number of country-
years in the panel by a factor of 2.5-3.16 Were the availability of these variables random across
countries, this sample cut would imply loss of precision but no bias in the estimates. However, not
surprisingly, data for richer countries is more easily come by so the data cuts resulting from the
inclusion of these limited-coverage variables can imply signi¯cant changes in the coe±cients due to
sample selection rather than the inclusion of an extra control variable. Hence the importance of
considering both basic and extended speci¯cations: those variables which are more widely available
ought to be examined in the more representative broad sample.
5 Results
Tables 1, 2 and 3 report the results of the three main regressions: the basic speci¯cation for
central government expenditures, the basic speci¯cation for local expenditures, and the extended
speci¯cation for central government expenditures. The corresponding results from the between
estimators are given in tables 4, 5, and 6
Openness
A look at the coe±cients on openness and its interaction with OECD membership in column (1) of
table 1 reveals that total expenditure increases strongly with openness in both industrialized and
less-developed countries. The point estimates from column 1 suggest that one standard deviation
increase in openness (46%) is associated with an increase in total central government expenditure
of over 3% of GDP in less-developed countries and almost 4% of GDP in industrialized countries.
However, columns (2) through (12) reveal the puzzle: a great deal of the increase, especially in less-
developed countries, is attributable to categories which do not clearly constitute social insurance.
Roughly two thirds of the increase in industrialized countries comes from transfers of some sort, a
little less than half of which appears to be social security. However, virtually none of the increase
in less-developed countries comes from social security, transfers, wages and salaries, or other likely
candidates for social insurance. Public goods also respond strongly to openness in industrialized
countries suggesting that much of the e®ect is not a form of public insurance.
Table 1 suggests three areas for this missing expenditure. First, in less-developed countries and
even more strongly in industrialized countries, greater openness is associated with more spending
on transportation. Second, in less-developed countries, there is an increase in spending on educa-
tion. Third, columns (1) and (3) of table 2 show that some of the increase in central government
expenditure associated with more openness in less-developed countries is due to a centralization of
expenditure. The one standard deviation increase in openness that is associated with a 4% increase
in expenditures at the central government level is simultaneously associated with a 1.2% decrease
in expenditures at the local level. However, a large fraction (over 40%) of the increase in total
spending remains unaccounted for, even by these three signi¯cant trends.17
Country Size and Fragmentation
16These numbers are ranges because the precise sample size depends on the category of expenditure.
17Meanwhile, in industrialized countries, greater openness is associated with signi¯cant increased expenditure at
the local level, largely in public wages and salaries.
12Comparing columns (2)-(7) from tables 1 and 2 shows that in many categories of public spending|
education, healthcare, public order and safety, and general public services|the decrease in central
government expenditure associated with a larger population is partially mitigated by an increase in
expenditure at the local level. Government consumption and public sector wages con¯rm this story
holds at higher levels of aggregation and tables 4 and 5 show that it is robust to a between estimator.
The total e®ects are quite large. A one standard deviation increase in the log of population leads
to a decrease in total expenditures of almost 1%, some portion of which is simply diverted to the
local level. Depending on the category, the increase at the local level can be from 10 to 60% of the
decrease at the central level. In the aggregate categories|government consumption and wages and
salaries|-it is between 40 and 45%.
Ethnic fractionalization is associated with a similar pattern though in this case, the increases at
the local level are stronger and more signi¯cant than the decreases at the central level. Education
is the only category that is robust to the between e®ects estimator.
Income
Richer countries tend to have more elderly and thus tend to spend more on social security and other
forms of social protection which drives greater total spending. Column (1) of table 1 shows that
when controlling for the fraction of the population over 65, richer countries tend to have smaller
government|the exact opposite of Wagner's Law. Digging a little further shows ¯rst, that the
negative relationship is indeed from within country variation rather than between country variation
(see column (1) of table 4) and second, that removing the control for demographics results in a large
and signi¯cant coe±cient on income. Finally, I regressed the di®erence between total expenditure
and expenditure on social security on the same set of controls. This non-social-security expenditure
declines with income, indicating that while social security is a luxury, the rest of government is a
necessity. At least during the period 1970-2000, the correlation between income and government
size is driven by demographics.
Demographics
A greater fraction of the population over 65 is associated with large and signi¯cant increases in
local expenditure in every single category save transportation (table 2). This correlation may be
caused by some omitted variable simultaneously causing both e®ects. For the moment, this is a
puzzle in search of an explanation.
Institutions of Government
The extended speci¯cation in table 3 gives a chance to examine the e®ects of explanatory variables
with narrower coverage such as inequality and political variables.
Governments elected under majoritarian electoral systems spend less across the board than
those elected under proportional systems. This holds true in the presence of either parliamentary
or presidential system of government.
Income Inequality and Political Rights
Both increased political rights and increased inequality (as measured by the Gini coe±cient) result
in strong increases in transfers (or social protection). A one standard deviation increase in the Gini
(9.4 points) is associated with an increase in transfers of 0.25% of GDP at the mean level of political
rights. The magnitude of the coe±cient on political rights is a bit harder to interpret because it's
an ordinal index of dubious cardinality. Furthermore, because the index has been normalized to
run between 1/7 and 1, the full coe±cient looks enormous because it represents a di®erence slightly
greater than between the most and least democratic nations. A one standard deviation change in
political rights (.33) would result in a 0.9% increase in transfers at the mean level of inequality.18
18In the robustness checks using the between estimator (table 6 columns 4 and 9) the point estimates are rather
13The actual e®ect of increasing political rights or increasing inequality on transfers are smaller
than the raw partial e®ect because of a strong and signi¯cant negative interaction between inequal-
ity and democracy. In essence, if the country displays a highly unequal distribution of wealth,
enfranchising additional poor voters does very little to change the income of the median voter (and
thus redistribution) because the median voter is already poor. On the other hand, if the country
has a relatively even distribution of wealth, enfranchising additional poor voters moves the decisive
voter from the upper-middle class towards the lower-middle class, signaling a real change in the
tax rate preferred by the decisive voter.
Meltzer and Richard's theory most clearly applies to vertically redistributive transfers like social
protection. However, any public good with bene¯ts which are more progressive than the tax code
ought to be subject to the MR e®ect though the e®ect should be more pronounced the more
redistributive the good. Nonetheless, columns (2)-(8) and (10) show little evidence of an e®ect on
other categories of expenditure. This suggests that demand for redistribution is met with the most
transparently redistributive type of spending: direct transfers.
6 Interpretation
Openness
The puzzle here is that the increased expenditures associated with increased openness in develop-
ing countries do not look much like social insurance. Developing countries likely have a greater
need for social insurance as they have less-developed domestic ¯nancial markets, poorer access to
international capital markets, and more volatile terms of trade. Rodrik argues the supply of social
insurance in these countries may be inelastic as they simply don't have the necessary infrastructure
of collection, distribution, and enforcement. This inelastic supply means that even though greater
openness stimulates higher demand for social insurance, there is no movement in the equilibrium
expenditure.
However, social security expenditures in developing countries average 4.4% of GDP in my sam-
ple; certainly less than the 12.4% in industrialized countries but a considerable fraction of gov-
ernment expenditure nonetheless.19 Establishing the relevant infrastructure is largely a ¯xed cost.
Thus if these countries already spend 4.4% of GDP on social security, the infrastructure is likely in
place and constitutes little barrier to increasing spending in response to an increase in demand for
public insurance.
Recall that a great deal of the increase in expenditure associated with greater trade openness is
not associated with a particular functional category of spending but is simply a higher level across
the board. This suggests that rather than a demand factor, which would likely a®ect some categories
of expenditure more than others, it may be a change in the supply of government spending (the
institutions of government) which accounts for the partial e®ect of openness on total spending in
developing (and to a lesser extent, developed) countries. Rather than an increase in pressure for
any particular type of good, trade openness a®ects the way general pressure for the entire array of
spending is accommodated.
Several papers in recent years have noted that ¯scal policy in developing countries is markedly
procyclical (Gavin et. al. (1996), Gavin and Peroti (1997), Talvi and Vµ egh (2000)). In fact, Talvi
and Vµ egh note that it is procyclical in most industrialized countries too: that only the G7 display
larger and the results for political rights while the signi¯cance levels drop from 1 and 5% to 5 and 10%.
19Countries who were not members of the OECD in 1975 are classi¯ed as developing countries.
14acyclical ¯scal policy. Talvi and Vµ egh propose a mechanism to explain this departure from the
traditional tax-smoothing prescription. They note that exogenous windfalls lead to greater political
pressure to spend and cite a number of studies demonstrating central governments' spectacularly
high marginal propensities to consume out of tax windfalls. As a result, they predict that, in the
presence of common pool problems, tax base volatility leads to pro-cyclical ¯scal policy. Developing
countries experience greater volatility of the tax base and hence have more procyclical ¯scal policy.
Stein, Talvi, and Grisanti (1998) ¯nd that institutional factors which exacerbate the common
pool problem are associated with pro-cyclical ¯scal policy. This builds on a longer line of work
showing that certain types of regimes run larger de¯cits or react to ¯scal shocks di®erently (Grilli,
Masciandaro, and Tabellini 1991, Alesina and Peroti 1995). The Talvi and Vµ egh model predicts an
increase in the cyclicity of ¯scal policy without a change in the level. However, they assume that
spending can be cut as easily as it can be increased and that governments have in¯nite horizons. In
fact, spending increases are politically easier than spending cuts and this hysteresis, coupled with
the fact that government horizons are ¯nite would likely lead to bias for larger average government
in countries with more volatile tax bases. This accords with the empirical ¯ndings of Stein, Talvi,
and Grisanti.
These strands can be woven into an alternate explanation for the association of openness with
higher government expenditure. If trade openness is associated with tax-base volatility, we would
expect to see higher total expenditure in more open countries. Because the increase would come
from common pool problems which are endemic to all types of government spending, we would
expect the e®ect to be a general increase across all functional categories rather than a spike in any
particular category. This is at least consistent with the pattern in table 1.
Alternately, if trade openness exacerbates the common pool problem, then a given level of tax-
base volatility would translate into a higher level of government expenditure again producing a
correlation between trade openness and a broad measure of government spending.
The jury is still out on whether trade openness increases the volatility of the tax-base.20 On the
other hand, trade policy is the classic arena for common pool problems. Policies of protection and
relief have narrow bene¯ts, broad costs, and ¯ercely active lobbies. It is plausible that more open
countries are characterized by broader political mobilization for trade protection. But this does
not necessarily translate into greater equilibrium levels of protection (see Grossman and Helpman
1994). Moreover, it is not clear how a greater intensity of lobbying over trade policy translates into
broad increases in government expenditure unless political organization for trade lobbying leads to
lobbying over a broader array of government policies.
To summarize, the large and robust increases in total expenditure associated with greater trade
openness are seen in very di®erent categories in industrialized and less-developed countries. In de-
veloped countries, the increases are concentrated in social security and transportation infrastructure
and wages at the state and local level. In less-developed countries, greater openness is associated
with greater spending on transportation infrastructure and education, and with a general increase
in central government consumption fueled by a centralization of expenditures across the board.
I submit that Rodrik's hypothesis explains only a small part of the e®ects of trade openness
on government expenditure. Another small part of the e®ect is due to increased expenditure on
the transportation networks that enable trade. But a large part of the e®ect is across-the-board
increases. These are more likely explained by the structure of government than by a shift in the
demand for a given type of expenditure. One possibility is that openness exacerbates the common
20The literature on trade openness and volatility is largely driven by a slightly di®erent question: whether trade
openness exacerbates the likelihood of ¯nancial crises.
15pool problem. Another possibility is that openness increases the volatility of the tax base and,
because of hysteresis in tax rates, leads to larger average government. For the moment the puzzle
remains.
Country Size and Fragmentation
The basic tenet of ¯scal federalism is that increased heterogeneity in preferences should lead to
a devolution of ¯scal policy prerogatives to lower levels of government where heterogeneity may
be less severe. If we assume that ethnic or linguistic a±liation is correlated with preferences over
public goods provision, then the results are consistent with this tenet: increased heterogeneity as
measured by the index of fractionalization is accompanied by decentralization of expenditure. Is
there also support for the Easterly-Levine hypothesis that an ethnic group's utility from public
goods declines when forced to share the public good with other ethnic groups? On the one hand,
education and healthcare involve signi¯cantly more interaction between consumers than do trans-
portation networks and public safety. The fact that the ¯reman protects the homes of another
ethnic group can hardly diminish the utility of having the ¯reman protect one's business. Trans-
portation, telecommunications, and energy grids are similarly impersonal. By contrast, education
and healthcare not only involve greater personal interaction in the classroom and clinic, but may
involve a signi¯cant skewing of bene¯ts for one group or another. If rich white Californians see their
tax dollars being spent on public schools from which they have largely withdrawn their children or
hospitals which cater mainly to poorer Hispanics, they may be reluctant to spend public money on
these goods. On the other hand, this is not really an example of a disutility to sharing, evidence
of an ethno-centric utility function. It can be explained simply by allowing for di®erences in pref-
erences across ethnicities, driven by persistent di®erences in wealth. The story about Californian
voters does not require that white voters su®er a disutility from having their children in the same
classrooms as Hispanic children. It simply requires that white voters be richer and less likely to en-
roll their children in public schools than Hispanic voters. The conclusion that can be drawn is that
education and healthcare policy are more complex than policy over transportation and public safety
and thus that the costs of heterogeneous preferences|driven by ethnicity, incomes, or any other
source of heterogeneity|are higher. Thus we see a greater decentralization of expenditure in these
complex categories in the face of fragmentation. To disentangle ethnocentric utility from a simple
correlation between ethnicity and preferences over public goods requires a di®erent approach.
The results in table 1 are consistent with the fact that both population and fragmentation
lead to increased heterogeneity of preferences which is coped with by devolution to the local level.
Nonetheless, decentralization does not account for the entirety of the e®ect: the decline in central
government expenditures associated with increased population is only partially mitigated by the
increase at the local level. Thus the results are also consistent with the existence of scale e®ects.
More tenuously, there is a correlation between the extent to which a decline in central government
expenditure on category X is reversed by an increase in local government expenditure on X and
the degree to which category X is likely to be subject to heterogeneous preferences. The e®ects of
country size on transportation, general public services, and public order and safety seem to be less
about decentralization and more about scale e®ects. In contrast, decentralization plays a larger role
in explaining the decline of central government spending in the more complex areas of education
and healthcare. This is not statistically rigorous, but it is suggestive.
Finally, the conjecture by ADEKW that increased tolerance of minorities positively in°uences
both measured religious heterogeneity and the extent of transfers, thereby explaining the (surpris-
ingly) positive correlation between the two is dealt a minor blow. Political rights|a decent proxy
for \tolerance of minorities"|is uncorrelated (½ = ¡0:02) with religious fractionalization in my
sample.
16Income
The results suggest that Wagnetr's Law is driven solely by demographics: older countries are
both richer and spend more on social security. This increases in social security drive the observed
increases in total expenditure and deliver the correlation between total expenditure and per capita
income. Total expenditure net of social security does not grow with per capita income.
It is instructive to note that those countries without a greying population have not seen the
same steady increase in government expenditure during the post-war period that OECD countries
have. Stein, Talvi, and Grisanti (1998) note that while average government spending in OECD
countries has jumped from 26.6% in 1960 to 49% in 1995, \Latin American governments grew very
rapidly through the seventies and early eighties, collapsed in the late eighties in the aftermath of
the debt crisis, and have remained fairly stable since the beginning of the nineties."
Of course, evidence for Wagner's Law can be found in earlier periods, sometimes in studies
delving back into the later nineteenth century (e.g. Easterly-Rebelo, Oxley). One might question
whether the same demographic trends explain Wagner's Law in earlier periods. While I do not
have the data to test the assertion, it is possible that the correlation of per capita income and
government size runs through social security spending in these studies as well. Oxley studies the
UK, where expenditures on social services already exceeded 16% of government expenditure by
1920 (compared to 43% in 1987).21 Easterly and Rebelo study the entire period from 1870-1988
so it is entirely possible that their ¯ndings are driven by the later period. Moreover, their sample
contains most of the countries with early establishment of social security. Most other studies ¯nding
evidence for Wagner's Law (e.g. Ram) examine the post-WWII period by which time social security
programs were widely established. The possibility that causality runs through demographics would
also explain why income and expenditure are only loosely co-integrated, as noted by Henrekson.
This seems like a demand-side explanation for Wagner's Law, but there may also be a supply-side
explanation concerning the technology of taxation. It is possible that the expansion of government
is enabled by advances in the ability of the state to raise revenue which then translates dispropor-
tionately into increases in social security spending by lowering the relative price of such programs.
Easterly and Rebelo note that in the period 1870-1988, \countries with higher incomes tend to
resort less to trade taxes and more to income taxes." They hypothesize that this may be due to
the relative costs of taxation: custom taxes require little overhead to establish but are costly to
administer while income tax collection requires a costly system of reporting and surveillance but
little marginal cost per extra dollar. Margaret Levi's Of Rule and Revenue (1988) lends support
for this view. Discussing the establishment of the income tax systems in Britain, she notes that
the state must overcome the natural reluctance of its citizens to be monitored and to grant the
power of the purse to the central government. This is a lengthy exercise in state-building requiring
signi¯cant investment in legitimacy and establishment of checks and balances to ensure executive
restraint. Without such an exercise, the state cannot collect taxes except by force which renders
the raising of revenue a costly endeavor. Levi further notes that the state must also give individual
citizens reason to believe that other citizens will also be paying: they must engender the proper
expectations to solve the collective action problem. Finally, the state must establish the system
of information collection and surveillance. Levi notes that in the past, war was often the catalyst
which convinced citizens that concentration of power was necessary. Income taxation was estab-
lished in Britain in 1798 (Napoleonic Wars), in Autralia in 1942 (WWII), and while established in
1913 in the US, income tax revenues remained at a paltry 1% of GDP as late as 1939, rising to
21Figures are from Liesner 1989
178.5% of GDP in 1944 (WWII). Easterly and Rebelo note that a higher level of income makes the
high ¯xed cost of establishing the system worthwhile.
Once the institutions of surveillance and collection are established, they remain despite the
lapse of the original impetus. The marginal cost of taxation declines and thus the relative price
of public goods declines. It is possible that increases in the e±ciency of taxation are responsible
for the rise of government. At the same time, such increased e±ciency may also a®ect the relative
prices of di®erent types of government spending and thus a®ect the composition of government
expenditure as well as its magnitude. In particular, a social security system requires much of
the same infrastructure of surveillance and trust which Levi describes as prerequisite for income
taxation. Citizens must believe the system will be ably managed|funds will be maintained rather
than raided for other public programs, fellow citizens will contribute their share and receive no
more than their share|and the government must have information about its citizens' income, age,
address, and employment status to collect the proper taxes and pay out the proper bene¯ts. These
expensive prerequisites for modern social security are all emplaced by the establishment of the
income tax system.
In this story, the connection between per capita income and social rests on three main factors.
In the ¯rst stages, the establishment of income taxation, often in response to wartime need for
revenue, reduces the relative price of public goods leading to an expansion of government spending.
At the same time, the price of social security relative to other public goods is particularly a®ected,
possibly leading to an early expansion of social security (though I am not aware of any studies
on the matter). Subsequently, the demand for social security is a function of demographics and
as richer countries age, their spending on social security, enabled by relatively e±cient income
taxation, drives the correlation between income and total government spending.
Institutions of Government
The fact that majoritarian electoral systems correlate with reduced spending across the board in
the presence of either system of government does not necessarily falsify the theoretical claims of
either Persson and Tabellini (1999) or Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno (2002). It could be
the case that while a majoritarian government lowers government expenditure for all categories, it
simultaneously \tilts" the incidence of expenditure in favor of some categories at the expense of
others. Persson and Tabellini would argue that the tilt is in favor of transfers at the expense of
public goods; Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno the opposite. It is quite possible that both
e®ects operate simultaneously. The question, of course, is how to measure the tilt in the face of
the evident shift. Since it is not possible to rigorously compare the coe±cients from the various
regressions, a new approach is required.
The idea that majoritarian governments are less pro°igate is not new. Austen-Smith (2000)
and Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno (2002) both predict that total government expenditure
is higher under proportional representation. Persson and Tabellini (2004) con¯rm these predictions
in a panel of 80 democracies during the 1990s. But Persson and Tabellini (2004) limit their study
to total expenditure and do not break out central government expenditure by category. This
study shows that their results are replicated in each category of expenditure: that majoritarian
government results in smaller expenditures across the board. It further shows that panel regressions
of expenditure shares cannot distringuish between Milesi-Feretti, Perotti, and Rostagno (2002) and
Persson and Tabellini (2004).
Income Inequality and Political Rights
The most surprising aspect of my results on income inequality and political rights is that they seem
to directly contradict the work of Easterly-Rebelo (1993) and Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin
18(2002, 2004) who ¯nd that the political regime has little e®ect on the extent of expenditures on
social security.
The most likely explanation for the seeming contradiction is the di®erence in samples. Mulligan,
Gil, and Sala-i-Martin (2002) use a cross-section of 65 countries. Because it is a cross-section, each
country enters the same number of times. In contrast, my extended speci¯cation, while covering
52 countries, is heavily weighted toward industrialized countries. Over half of the country-periods
are from current members of the OECD and roughly two thirds of the remaining country-periods
are from Latin American countries. Seventy percent of the country-years score either a 1 or a 2
on the unmodi¯ed Gastil index. As a result, it is likely that my results speak to variation within
democracies while those of Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin speak to variation over a wider range
of political systems. It would seem that, among democracies, political rights and participation do
matter in the manner suggested by Benabou's extension of Meltzer and Richard, even if, as broad
groups, autocracies and democracies do not di®er much in levels of social protection.
7 Conclusion
By systematically testing the leading theories of government size, this paper has generated a variety
of interesting results including a new explanation for Wagner's Law, evidence that fragmentation
leads to decentralization rather than an outright decline in expenditure, evidence that the extent
of the franchise a®ects the degree of redistribution in advanced democracies, and a puzzle for the
role of trade openness.
These ¯ndings emphasize the importance of considering the structure of government: the supply
side of government expenditure. Correlations in the government size literature defy explanation by
a simple demand shift alone. Even Wagner's Law may be driven by changes in the technology of
taxation as well as changing ¯scal preferences of the polity. Increases in government expenditure
associated with greater trade openness are not associated with any particular function (such as
public insurance) but are simply increases across all categories. This suggests that, rather than
by shifting demand, the in°uence of trade openness on government expenditure is likely due to a
change in the way the pressure for any type of spending is accommodated by government. Factors
which increase the heterogeneity of preferences| increased population and ethnic fragmentation|
are associated with a decentralization of expenditure rather than an outright decline in expenditure.
Redistributive spending correlates with measures of inequality but also correlates with a measure
of the e®ective franchise.
Much of the past work on the literature on government size has focused on identifying various
social and demographic variables and measuring their e®ect on government spending through an
implicit shift in the demand for public goods. Many of the interesting questions for future research
in this ¯eld concern the manner in which the structure of government{ the mechanism by which
public goods are supplied{ channels this shifting demand for public expenditure. Here are a few
that have arisen from this paper. To what degree does trade openness exacerbate the common pool
problem in public expenditure by increasing the volatility of the tax base? Does ¯scal federalism
accommodate preference heterogeneity and solve deadlock better for certain types of expenditure?
What are the di®erences both between democracies and autocracies and among democracies in
their provision of social security? How does a change in the relative cost of provision a®ect the
level of public goods provided? It is only through explicit attention to the supply of public goods as
well as the demand for them that observed patterns of government expenditure will become clear.
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